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Affective vs. Semantic Processing:
Toward a Teleological View of Language
Richard N. Williams
Camille S. Williams
Brigham Young University
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship of linguistics to cognitive psychology has been well
drawn. Many have listed the development of modern structuralist
linguistics as one of the major contributing factors to the rise of
modern cognitive psychology (Reynolds & Flagg, 1977, for example). Some
other important points should be reviewed here in order to be clear
about the major argument of this paper.
In both of these disciplines the flow of information is traced through a
system. In cognitive psychology information is traced through various
stores and processors to the resultant behavior; in linguistics
information is traced from essential meaning through the language system
to a surface manifestation.
Both cognitive psychology and linguistics view behavior to be a function
of rules and transformations. Information is transformed according to
orderly processes and rules. There is, therefore, in both disciplines a
belief in and emphasis on an underlying structure which determines
surface manifestations of language acts and behavior.
These commonalities of cognitive psychology and linguistics come from a
common heritage in modern structuralist philosophy. There is also a
central problem for each field of study which has its roots in common
with those of the problem in the other field. tor cognitive
psychologists, the problem is the image of hum~n nature, and how best to
represent it in terms of processes. For linguistics, the problem is
what must be the structure of language in the human being. Both present
their subjects--cognition and language acts--as results of rather
complex but orderly processes deriving from some structure which comes
with our nature. When we study/observe behavior, we infer about the
cognitive structure from which it arose. When we study language
behavior, we infer about the linguistic system from which it arose.
Here is where linguists become psychologists whether they want to or
not. A model of language or language capacity rests upon and has
implications for--a model of the human psyche. Language makes a
statement and conveys meaning about human psychology, both on the level
of competence and performance.
There are closer and more intimate relations between cognitive
psychology and linguistics which we must introduce for purposes of the
presentation. First, cognitive psychology and linguistics meet in the
field of semantics and semantic processing. Semantics can be seen as
the "bottom line" of linguistics manifested for example in the idea of a
"deep structure" or basic unit of meaning. Semantics also seems to be
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the "bottom line" of cognitive science. If information is going to stay
around in the cognitive system and accessible for very long, it must be
processed "semantically," or "to a semantic leveL" This is the basis
of our permanent knowledge (along with Tulving's (1972) episodic memory,
but even here there is a "semantic" or "meaning" component).
II.

MODELS OF MEMORY

Semantics or semantic processing lies at the heart of one of the core
constructs and also one of the core distinctions in the sciences of
cognition--the memory system. For example, it was shown in Ebbinghaus'
early work (1885) that meaningfulness is troublesome. Ebbinghaus found
that the meaning of his learning material got in the way of his study of
the "pure" process of learning. He devised the "nonsense syllable" or
CVC trigram to obviate the problem.
The received view of human memory has been the "structural model" or
"duplex model" or memory (see Reynolds & Flagg, 1977; Bourne, et al.,
1979; Kintsch, 1977; Solso,. 1979; or most any other current cognitive
psychology book) in which.-there are two distinct "stores" (1) short term
memory and (2) long term memory.
Short Term Memory is of brief duration and limited capacity. In this
store material is processed acoustically, visually, etc., but only the
most elementary if any semantic processing is carried out. Rehearsal is
necessary to keep the material available because it is not processed
into some permanent semantic structure. If it endures, it's because it
got passed on to Long Term Memory.
Long Term Memory is of longer (unlimited) duration and greater
(unlimited) size. In this store material is processed "semantically,"
i.e., to a level of meaning. Here material fits into the extant
structure of knowledge of the individual. Out of Long Term Memory the
cognitive processes operate. From here decisions about "pertinence"
(Norman, 1976), or "allocation" (Kahnemean, 1973) are made. From here
behaviors, and ideas are generated. From here language operates because
here exist the raw materials on which language processes can work.
Recently, Craik & Lockhart (1972) have offered a radical alternative to
the duplex theory of memory--the "depth of processing" model. This is a
"process" rather than a "structural" model. The idea of two separate
memory stores is seen as arbitrary and unnecessarily complex and
unparsimonious. In this model the strength of the memory trace is a
function not of which structural processor the material in question
happens toreside in, but rather, a function of the "depth" to which it
has been processed. The depth of processing in turn is a function of
(a) the nature of the material, and (b) the nature of the task at hand
(what is being done to the material, and for what purpose). Deep
processing in this model means "semantic" processing.
Research support for the Depth of Processing model has come from various
sources, some of the most direct evidence has come from studies on
"incidental learning." In this paradigm (Hyde & Jenkins, 1969, 1973;
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Rosenberg & Schiller, 1971; Parkin, 1979) subjects are presented a list
of words. Note that these are language materials. The first group is
asked to learn the words intentionally. The second group is asked to
deal with the words semantically by performing some semantic task--most
commonly to rate the words for pleasantness on a pleasant (PL) to
unpleasant (UPL) dimension. The third group is asked to perform a lower
order task with the words, such as search for a particular letter or
estimate the number of letters. This is a non-semantic task. These
second and third tasks are called incidental tasks. A recall test is
then given to all of the groups. The semantic and nonsemantic groups
are not expecting it. Therefore, any learning they show would be
incidental.
It is found (as in Hyde & Jenkins, 1969) that the group which performs
the semantic task does about as well on the recall task as the group
that intentionally learns. Both do better than the non-semantic task
group. The notion is that the semantic task results in "deeper"
processing and thus better memory (even without conscious effort).
The principle criticism of the depth of processing model has been the
lack of an independent measure of "depth" as well as lack of an adequate
theory of depth. Why for example, should "deeper" be "deeper," and/or
why is "semantic" processing "deep" processing? (See Baddeley, 1978.)
The only evidence for depth is better recall, but better recall is
precisely what is predicted from depth. It is to this issue that the
research described here is in large part addressed.
III. ISSUES OF THE PRESENT STUDY
In the incidental learning literature which has addressed this issue,
the "semantic" task has most often been rating the words on a "PL-UPL"
dimension. Only rarely have other kinds of sem~rttic processing been
employed (Parkin, 1979; Block & Reed, 1978; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973). The
main effect (i.e., better memory) for semanti~ tasks has been well
validated. The PL-UPL rating task is obviously a semantic task and
calls for semantic level processing. However, it also calls for an
affective evaluation. The difference between the effects of semantic
and affective incidental tasks has not been widely investigated. It
might be that affective processing involves different processes and
produces different results than "semantic processing." If the
superiority of affective processing could be demonstrated, a candidate
for an independent measure and theory of depth would emerge.
There is some evidence for the relative superiority of affective over
semantic processing. Evidence for the distinctiveness of affective
processing comes from Toglia & Battig (1978). Ratings of PL over 2,854
words do not correlate highly with ratings on six other semantic
dimensions: concreteness, imagery, categorizability, meaningfulness,
familiarity, and number of attributes. Packman & Battig (1978) had
subjects rate words on each of these six semantic dimensions as well as
PL-UPL. Incidental recall and recognition scores showed subjects in the
PL-UPL condition to have superior recall to that of the other groups and
no difference among the other groups emerged.
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These studies lead to the conclusion that affective processing is
fundamentally different from other kinds of semantic processing, or, put
another way (more linguistically), the processing of affective qualities
of words (language material) is different from, and somehow superior to,
the processing of other semantic qualities.
The research presented here extends and cross validates the findings of
Packman & Battig in several important ways. We also attempted to
replicate the findings of Hyde & Jenkins (1969). First, Packman &
Battig used visual presentation. We used auditory presentation of words
as a replication of Hyde & Jenkins (1969), and 24 words as opposed to 50
in the Packman and Battig study. " Second, dichotomous ratings were made
rather than ratings on an extend scale (this might inhibit full semantic
processing). The present study included an intentional group as a
control (as in Hyde and Jenkins). The words presented were highly
related (Hyde and Jenkins). There were six non-antonymic first
associates and six antonymic first associates, in the list. Finally,
cluster scores were analyzed as Hyde and Jenkins did, but Packman and
Battig did not.
It might be beneficial nere to step outside this experimental paradigm
to introduce another line of research. These variables, affective
processing and antonymic association, were chosen for the present study
for theoretically important reasons. The attempt is to unite two bodies
of research and introduce a teleological, humanistic approach to the
study of cognitive processing and hence, linguistics.
These two variables were taken from Rychlak's (1979) Logical Learning
Theory (LLT). Rychlak proposes that behavior (including linguistic and
cognitive behaviors) proceeds in a ~ forma way, rather than in a
reactive way. Instead of speaking of behavior as a response, Rychlak
has introduced the notion of a teloeponse. The idea is that behavior is
always telic--teleological--it is carried out "for the sake of" some
conception or intention on the part of the person rather than in
response to stimuli or conditions. Logical Learning Theory presents a
teleological account of human behavior based on final causes. Behavior
is always, therefore, purposive and intentional. Such a view is at odds
with efficient-cause S-R psychology, structuralist, formal cause
psychology, and other quasi-mechanistic systems.
Rychlak offers a modus operandi of human mentation which does not rely
on material- or efficient-cause determinism nor an external natural
teleology to account for human behavior. Intentional behavior, and thus
human freedom, or agency are possible. Two concepts are important in
this modus operandi. First, Rychlak proposes (and validates via
empirical research) the operation and existence of a neo-Kantian
category of the understanding called affective assessment. Human beings
are born with the capacity to affectively assess and evaluate things
with which they come into contact. Things favorably assessed tend to be
selected for elaboration and made more meaningful, or, affirmed and
selected to become the grounds "for the sake of which" behavior (overt
or cognitive) takes place. This process is called meaning-extension.
We tend to further meanings along a positive affective dimension. One
thing this implies is that people should normally learn what they like
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faster than what they dislike. This effect has been demonstrated in a
series of studies carried out over the last 20 years with material
ranging from words to nonsense syllables, to pictures, to names, to
items on IQ tests, to psychology experiments themselves. It should be
noted that it is also possible that people learn disliked negative items
more readily than liked. Several pathological groups show this, as well
as people who dislike the experiment to begin with.
It is important to note that this affective assessment of material has
been shown to be (a) independent of the associative value of the
material (i.e., past experience, frequency, etc.), and, (b) idiographic
in nature (i.e., it must be assessed individually and it varies from
person to person); it is not
normative process.

a

The second important principle from Logical Learning Theory is that
human beings are endowed with the capacity to think and reason
dialectically (i.e., in terms of opposites or, more broadly, in terms of
alternatives). This capacity for dialectical, creative, and potentially
arbitrary thought is, for Rychlak, the basis of human freedom. One need
not be determined by previous input if he or she has the capacity to
generate alternatives and thus call into question his or her own
mentation. It is noted here, therefore, that any theory which does not
have place for dialectical reasoning, relying instead on unipolar
demonstrative principles, must miss the human essence of human nature
and must degenerate into quasi-mechanistic determinism.
These two concepts then, affective assessment, and the dialectic were
chosen for investigation because they are difficult for behavioristic
approaches or cybernetic approaches to account for. Indeed, in a
cognitive system any processor which can affectively evaluate or reason
dialectically must possess all the characteristics and capacities of a
real, intact human being. The alternative to this conception of free
affective evaluation is that thinking is only unjpolar and logical and
that affect is a product of past association. Such would be a
behavioristic explanation which most cognitive'psychologists and
linguists are motivated to avoid. For these reasons, then, affective
assessment and oppositional association were chosen for inclusion in the
present study.
V.

METHOD AND RESULTS

Four groups of subjects (randomly assigned) participated in the study.
Each was given a different task to perform relative to a group of words
as follows: 1) The Intentional group was instructed to remember as many
words as they could; 2) The Like-Dislike group was instructed to rate
words indicating whether they liked or disliked them; 3) The
Concrete-Abstract group was instructed to decide whether each word
brought to mind a concrete image or an abstract idea on a dichotomous
scale; 4) The Letter Task group was instructed to estimate the number of
letters in each word by means of a dichotomous, more than five letters
or less than five letters scale.
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The words were common words taken from the Palermo & Jenkins (1964) word
association norms. Six were non-antonym first associate pairs, six were
antonym first associates. The order of presentation was randomized.
The words were presented on a tape recorder at the rate of one word
every two seconds. All groups were then asked to recall all the words
they could, in any order in a free recall format.
An analysis of variance of the total recall scores (see Table I) showed
a significant main effect for groups (F(3,41)=11.329, p<.OOOl). The
Like-Dislike group performed better than the Concrete-Abstract group
which performed better than the Intentional group which performed better
than the Letter Task group. A Newman-Keuls analxsis showed only the
recall of the Like-Dislike group to be better than the rest (p <.05).
Table I
Mean Recall Scores for Intentional Group
and Three Incidental Groups

MEAN
RECALL

LIKE-DISLIKE'

GROUPS
CONCRETE-ABSTRACT

LETTER TASK

INTENTIONAL

16.75*

12.33

11.08

10.83

* This mean is significantly different from the other group
means according to Newman-Keuls procedures at .05
probability level.
Since the words were associated we can assess the amount of clustering
which took place during recall. Cluster ratios were computed for each
subject in all groups (see Table II). A cluster ratio is defined as the
number of clusters divided by opportunities to cluster. Analysis of
variance showed a main effect for group (F(3,41)=4.808 p<.006).
Newman-Keuls analyses showed the Intentional group clustered less than
the other groups. This might reflect a bad learning strategy for that
group.
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Table II
Mean Cluster Scores* for Intentional Group
and Three Incidental Groups
GROUPS
CONCRETE-ABSTRACT

LIKE-DISLIKE

LETTER TASK

INTENTIONAL

.411

.390

.329

.169**

MEAN
CLUSTER
SCORE

*A cluster score is defined as clustering/opportunity to
cluster.
**This mean is significantly different from the other group
means according to Newman-Keuls procedure at .05
probability level.
When the type of semantic relationship is taken into account (see
Table III), once again there was a significant main effect for the group
factor (F 3 1 =11.059,
p<.001). Also there was a significant main
effect fof t~e)semantic relationship of the words; antonym pairs were
recalled more than non-antonym pairs. Tests of simple main effects
showed antonyms were recalled better than non-antonyms only for the
Like-Dislike and Concrete-Abstract groups (F(1,41)=22.958, p<.001).
Table III
Mean Recall Scores of ..
First-Associate and Antonym P,airs for
Intentional Group and Three Incidental Groups
GROUPS
LIKE-DISLIKE

CONCRETE-ABSTRACT

LETTER TASK

INTENTIONAL

2.90*

1.36*

1.55

1.46

4.46*

3.46*

2.18

1.64

FIRST
ASSOCIATE
PAIRS
ANTONYM
PAIRS

*

Means for first-associate pairs and antonym pairs are
significantly different for these groups according to
tests of simple effects.

There was thus a significant interaction of group with semantic
relationship. It can be seen that only the Like-Dislike and
Concrete-Abstract groups seemed to benefit from semantic relations in
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the stimulus words and that (significantly) antonymic relationship was
more conducive to recall than non-antonymic relation. This is
graphically represented in Figure I.
Figure I

5.0-

Mean Recall Scores of
First-Associate and Antonym Pairs by
Intentional Group and Three Incidental Groups

4.0-

3.0-

2.0--FirstAssociate
Pairs

1.0-

LIKEDISLIKE
VI.

CONCRETEABSTRACT

LETTER
TASK

INTENTIONAL

Discussion

There are several important implications of the above findings for both
cognitive psychology and linguistic theory. From this research and that
of Battig and his colleagues, a possible independent measure of depth
has emerged. Deep processing is affective processing. Affective
assessment is, therefore, a measure of depth of processing. Rychlak's
work has previously demonstrated that affect has a unique effect on
learning. Packman & Battig (1978) suggest that it is not affect ~~
which accounts for superior memory, but the distinctiveness of the
affective processing task as compared to the other semantic tasks. This
is an alternative which can be empirically investigated. Present
research is being addressed to this question.
Cognitive theory has difficulty accounting for affective evaluation and
preference. Either it has been largely left alone in the literature or
there has been posited an "affective processing box" in the model which
takes care of affect (usually this processor has all the properties of a
real person). Other theories maintain that affective assessment comes
out of Long Term Memory as a product of past association history.
Cognitive theory insofar as it embraces this explanation is not far
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removed from behaviorism.
type of explanation.

Rychlak's work seems to argue against this

There is in linguistic theory (as we have studied it) a parallel
difficulty: how can the present results be accounted for by linguistic
theory? Affect has been largely left alone by linguistic theories as
well. We might ask, why should "affective assessment" make a difference
in the processing and remembering of linguistic material? Specifically,
why should affect make more of a difference than other "semantic"
processes? There seem to be two ways of accounting for affect:
(a) teleologically as suggested here, or (b) on the basis of past
history and experience, not far removed from behavioristic psychology.
It would appear also that affect doesn't behave like other semantic
features and cannot, therefore, be dealt with as a feature among others.
It appears difficult to account for the effect of affect with a "feature
analysis" approach.
How can linguistic theory account for the relative efficacy of antonymic
association over non-antonymic association? The most obvious answer is
that antonym associations are stronger than other kinds. The larger
question is still why that should be the case.
How can we accommodate
these dialectical processes in our linguistic theory?
The concept of affective assessment and its influence on learning and
language (and also the concept of the dialectical nature of language)
seem to argue in favor of a teleological, intentional, creative theory
of language and cognition. Language and cognition can be more
profitably seen as products of a creative purposive person rather than
some suprapersonal and thus impersonal linguistic or cognitive
"system"--which can (for purposes of study) be "abstracted from its
occasional bearer" (Schrag 1975). Furthermore, the effects of affect
(through the works of Rychlak) are shown to be idiographic and unique
rather than nomothetic or normative. Linguistic .. theory, by its very
self-definition seems to be pursuing the disco~ery and exploration of
normative and nomothetic principles which account for language behavior.
The results presented here would suggest that linguistic theory must
account for idiosyncratic affective processing.
When the type of teleological model being discussed here is applied to
linguistics and language acquisition, a picture of the language act as
more creative, more affectively toned, and more projective emerges.
Language is thus seen as a creative endeavor rather than the end product
of the operation of cognitive processes or laws associated with an
innate structure of language. Usage of language is to be understood in
terms of its affectively toned meaningfulness to the user, and in terms
of the goal or intention toward which it is directed. Language can or
ought to be approached as the product and project of an intentional
human being, rather than as product and project of itself. The study of
behavior should yield as much insight into the "behaver" as it does into
the cognitive structure from which it comes. The study of language
behavior should yield as much insight into the language user as it does
into the linguistic system from which it arises.
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